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The economic success of the World Cup begins with the financial success of the orga-
nizing committee, which was able to achieve a surplus of €155 million; part of this sur-
plus was passed to the German Olympic Sports Association, with the result that sports 
other than soccer have also benefited financially from the soccer World Cup (N.N. 
2007c).  In addition there are, for example, reports from television companies that there 
were considerable increases in viewer ratings for the World Cup (N.N. 2007a), and re-
ports of increased turnover for manufacturers of table-football equipment and for brew-
eries.
1  Although it cannot be denied that individual enterprises and sectors have prof-
ited, the economic effects will be investigated more fully below on the basis of devel-
opments in meso- and macro-economic data. These data have the advantage that they 
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aggregate possible increases in the profits and incomes of individuals with the losses of 
others, and thereby present an overall economic picture. 
Numbers and prices of overnight stays 
The number of overnight stays in Germany in June 2006 was some 1.6 million higher 
than in the same month of the previous year; in July the increase amounted to 0.6 mil-
lion. However, for many reasons it is questionable to attribute this to the soccer World 
Cup. For one thing, the preceding year might turn out to have been particularly weak. 
For another, there has in any case been a slightly positive growth in the number of over-
night stays in Germany over the past ten years; they have risen from 23.9 million (visi-
tors from within Germany or from other countries) in 1997 to 27.6 million in 2006, 
which corresponds to an annual growth of 1.4%. The broken line in Figure 1 shows the 
growth in overnight stays in German hotels for 1997–2006 on the basis of the raw data. 
It is at once obvious that the overnight numbers show seasonal fluctuation, and it is the-
refore useful to perform the analysis with the help of seasonally adjusted data. With 
regard to the trend observed for Germany as a whole, the corresponding seasonally ad-
justed values (Fig. 1 continuous line; X12 method, US Census Bureau) do not show any 
deviation that can be attributed to the World Cup
2. Individual reports from the World 
Cup host cities present an even more sceptical overall picture. For example, the average 
utilization  of available accommodation in June 2006 compared with June 2005 fell in 
Berlin by 11.1% and in Munich by 14.3% (N.N. 2006d), which points to a World Cup-
related crowding-out effect on normal tourism.  
Also, it is clear from Figure 2, which focuses on seasonally adjusted data for overnight 
stays in the years 2004 to 2006, that the increases during June and July 2006 were im-
mediately preceded and followed by lower numbers in the months of May and August. 
Note: not only was the normal growth of 1.4% not achieved in May and August, but 
there were even lower overnight numbers in absolute terms in comparison with previous 
years. It is conceivable that tourists who would otherwise have sought overnight ac-
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commodation in Germany during May and/or August transferred their stay to the World 
Cup months (‘time switching’). This, too, can be interpreted as a crowding-out effect. 































































































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt: Entwicklung der Ankünfte und Übernachtungen in Beherbergungs-
stätten, in: Fachserie 6, Reihe 7.1. 
However, although the increases in the numbers of overnight stays were not statistically 
significant, the hotel sector compensated with prices 4.8% higher than those in June 
2005. Even though Figure 3 shows that the price rise remained in place after the World 
Cup (and therefore could be attributed to other causes such as the general upswing in 
Germany), this might have contributed to the fact that 41% of hoteliers nevertheless felt 
their (positive) expectations of the World Cup to have been realized
3. 
Effects on retail trade 
Some reports have recorded increases in the retail sector of some €2 milliard based on 
the World Cup. Figure 4, which represents the percent change in retail sales figures 
compared with the previous year, reveals that the World Cup months of June and July 
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2006 were characterized by decreases (!) in turnover.
4 It must be borne in mind that 
these numbers do not include possible increases in sales at filling stations and in the 
field of fan celebrations (which, however, were partly cancelled out by catering losses 
in other regions): just as already observed for other sporting mega-events, many con-
sumers might have been diverted from their normal consumption behaviour by the 
World Cup itself, or by what they saw in the stadiums, in the ‘Fan-Mile’ street markets 
or on television. Or they chose – and this is an exaggeration – to entertain themselves 
very well at home by watching the live broadcasts of the soccer and restricting them-
selves to the consumption of fast food (the ‘couch potato’ effect). 

















































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt: Entwicklung der Ankünfte und Übernachtungen in Beherbergungs-
stätten, in: Fachserie 6, Reihe 7.1. 
Income from international tourism 
The previously reported data regarding consumption and accommodation do not differ-
entiate between the activities of German residents and those of people from other coun-
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tries. However, analyses of sports events should evaluate the expenditure exclusively of 
non-residents as an impulse to the economy of the host region. As for the people from 
within Germany itself, it can be assumed that their increased expenditure during the 
sporting event is counterbalanced by reductions in their consumption elsewhere and that 
the savings rate overall remains constant at least in the medium term (Maennig 1998). 
It is worth taking a look at the statistics of the service balance sheet, in which the ex-
penditure of foreign tourists is included. The Deutsche Bundesbank reports additional 
incomes from tourism at €1.5 milliard in the months from May to July 2006 in compari-
son with the previous year, in which are included the expenditure for accommodation 
and travel within Germany as well as the consumption of the World Cup visitors who 
came from other countries.
5 Figure 5 shows the clear rise in takings from international 
tourism, in which a considerable proportion of the additional income had already oc-
curred in May, i.e. well before the start of the World Cup. 
 
                                                 
5  The Bundesbank detects certain inaccuracies, since, for example, the additional income of local air-
lines is not included. On the other hand, ticket sales are included, of which a considerable proportion 
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Figure 3: Price monitor of the German national bureau of statistics: bed and 
breakfast (deviation of the price index in June 2006 in %)  
 
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt: Preismonitor des Statistischen Bundesamtes. Gastronomie. Über-
nachtung mit Frühstück. Downloaded from http://www.destatis.de/indicators/d/ vpigraf07.htm on 
8 March 2007. 
The above-mentioned €1.5 milliard increase in receipts at first appears to be consider-
able, but must once again be put into perspective in several ways. First, this sum in the 
order of milliards corresponds to only 0.07% (!) of the gross domestic product for Ger-
many in 2006. Although this is not of itself an argument against the economic effective-
ness of the soccer World Cup, it does emphasize that in a large national economy any 
impulses are rapidly condemned to statistical insignificance. Hence, it must be empha-
sized once more that the above-mentioned rise (corresponding to some 22.5% compared 
with the same period in the previous year) should be considered against the background 
of the gradual positive trend that is occurring in any case in receipts from international 
tourism. Between 1997 and 2005, i.e. disregarding any World Cup effect, the average 
growth in receipts from international tourism amounted in any case to ~5.1% per year. 
In addition one must ask, as already discussed, whether at the same time there were 
counterbalancing effects of the World Cup, so that the net effect for the balance sheet 
for tourism turns out to be less positive. Figure 6 demonstrates that expenditure by 
German tourists in other countries during May to July 2006 was clearly above the level 
for the previous year. For example, during the World Cup, Mallorca was booked out WP 10/2007 – One year later    7 
 
(which is unusual for this time of year) and operated as ‘the 13th fanpark’ (N.N. 2006a). 
This ‘carnival effect’ of large sporting events or the incentive for the local people to 
‘flee’ from the noise, traffic jams, etc., in the host region (and to become consumers in 
other countries) at least partially cancels out the extra foreign visitors. Although in the 
case of those tourists in Mallorca who visited the 13th fanpark, the motives may have 
lain not so much in the avoidance of the sporting event but rather in an enjoyment of the 
World Cup free of work pressures; even so, the passive net effect of the additional trips 
abroad of German citizens on the tourism balance sheet still stands, so long as this tra-
vel activity is not a question simply of trips that have been either brought forward or 
delayed. 
Figure 4: ‘Couch potato effect’: retail turnover in Germany, change from the pre-



















































































































































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt. Long-term series: domestic trade, catering and hotel industry, tour-
ism. Real retail sales excluding cars and filling stations. Percent change compared with the same 
month in the previous year. WP 10/2007 – One year later    8 
 











































































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank: Zeitreihen-Datenbank: Dienstleistungsverkehr mit dem Ausland. 
Downloaded from 
<http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_zeitreihen.php?func=list&tr=www_s201_b02> on 8 
March 2007. 
A comprehensive comparison of the tourism balance sheets for the months of May to 
July 2006 gives a decrease of ~€324 million in the (traditionally passive) German tour-
ism service balance (seasonally adjusted: €309 million, corresponding to 0.01% of the 
GDP). Over the whole of the year 2006, there was overall a net improvement of only 
€60 million in comparison with 2005 – an amount that in terms of the total economy is 
negligible, from whatever perspective it is considered. 
Employment effect 
The national labour agency reports 25,000 to 50,000 additional jobs arising from the 
World Cup, although most of them were temporary in nature (N.N. 2006c). From the 
point of view of just 40 million persons gainfully employed in Germany this corre-
sponds to an increase of 0.06% to 0.13%. Here, too, it is appropriate that whatever in-
creases in employment there may have been at the time of the World Cup be adjusted in 
the context of an employment trend that overall in the year 2006 was distinctly positive. 
Throughout 2006 the employment figures exceeded the values for the corresponding WP 10/2007 – One year later    9 
 
months in the previous year. However – and this is true not only for the raw data but 
also for the seasonally adjusted data – the otherwise usual seasonal downturn in the em-
ployment figures for June and July did not occur in 2006. Nevertheless, statistical evi-
dence of economically significant increases in employment through the World Cup is 
hard to find.
6 It must again be borne in mind that in the larger economies any impulse is 
rapidly consigned to insignificance. 
All together, it must be taken as an interim result that most of the effects on turnovers of 
retail business, tourism and employment that feature in the foreground of discussions 
about the economics of the soccer World Cup (and other major sporting events) turn 
out, at least in the short term, to be smaller than supposed. It is not at present possible to 
determine whether there will be positive medium- or long-term effects of the 2006 
World Cup on the host cities; however, on the grounds of empirical studies of compara-
ble sporting events it appears at least that they cannot be guaranteed.
7 
                                                 
6  Regressions performed on the above-mentioned sample yielded no significant values for the World 
Cup dummies. Hagn and Maennig (2007b) in a multivariate study do not find any significant decreases 
in unemployment in the host cities of the 2006 soccer World Cup. 
 
7   For the 1974 soccer World Cup, no significant short-, medium- or long-term effects on employment in 
the German host cities can be seen (Hagn and Maennig 2007a). For the 1996 Olympic Games in At-
lanta there are significant positive medium-term effects on employment, but no significant effects on 
wages (Hotchkiss, Moore and Zobey 2003). With regard to the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, there 
are significant positive long-term effects on incomes in areas of Germany in which contests of the 
Games took place, but no significant effect on employment (Jasmand and Maennig 2007). For an 
overview of empirical studies of short-term effects and/or other sports events, see du Plessis and 
Maennig (2007). WP 10/2007 – One year later    10 
 











































































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank loc. cit. 
World Cup stadiums, novelty effect and urban development 
Following on from this first disappointing interim balance sheet, consideration should 
be given to the likelihood of positive effects in other areas that are frequently given less 
attention in descriptions of the 2006 World Cup, for example because they are pre-
sumed to be negative or less satisfactorily quantifiable.  
It is worth beginning with construction works. The expenditure on the stadiums in 
which the World Cup was held reached more than €1.4 milliard (Feddersen et al., 
2006). In addition, investments in the related infrastructure amounted to nearly €2 mil-
liard (Maennig and Buettner, 2007). 
First, it should be stressed that this expenditure should not be equated with the corre-
sponding World Cup costs. This is obvious, for example, for the ‘World Cup’ stadiums 
in Hamburg and Gelsenkirchen, which were already in place before FIFA had finalized 
the decision in 2000 to award the World Cup competition to Germany. But even with 
the stadiums that were built or modernized after the announcement, the costs can not all 
be attributed to the World Cup. A particularly illuminating example is the arena in Mu-
nich: ‘FC Bayern’ and to some extent ‘1860’ have used the Munich Olympic stadium WP 10/2007 – One year later    11 
 
since 1972, but have long wished for a stadium offering greater comfort and atmos-
phere, in particular better accommodation for VIPs and business contacts. However, the 
architect’s copyright, the needs of monument protection, and the wish to preserve the 
athletics track all contributed to the impossibility of undertaking improvements to the 
Olympic stadium.  
Although the two clubs were ready to bear the cost of the new building themselves, 
public support was initially weak on account of concerns over a future largely unused 
(and perhaps deteriorating) Olympic stadium (a ‘Coliseum’ effect). Only after Franz 
Beckenbauer, President of the Organizing Committee for the 2006 World Cup and Vi-
ce-President of FC Bayern, warned that Munich would be considerably disadvantaged 
in the process of selection of the World Cup host cities, did a survey of the public in 
Munich open the way for a new building in Munich-Fröttmaning. The World Cup was 
therefore in no way the cause of the investment, but was a welcome inducement. A si-
milar reasoning is valid for all 12 of the ‘World Cup’ stadiums, perhaps with the excep-
tion of Leipzig. 
Costs (of stadiums) should be seen as the portion of use of resources that arises through 
the production of a given product in a specified period (here, the World Cup in Ju-
ne/July 2006). The World Cup and other events generate costs because they (can) con-
tribute to the wear and tear of the stadium, which is normally written off as deprecia-
tion. With regard to the amount of these costs, it can be noted, for example, that stadi-
ums erected or modernized in connection with the 1974 soccer World Cup after about 
30 years no longer met the economic requirements of the soccer clubs. On the assump-
tion of linear depreciation, these costs take the form of a depreciation amounting to 
~3.3% of the size of the investment per year. This corresponds to 0.6% or €9 million of 
World Cup-derived stadium costs on the basis of 10 weeks exclusive use of the stadium 
for the World Cup, including the periods of pre- and post-match operations. The orga-
nizing committee assigned €1.5 million to each stadium operator (DFB 2007), so that 
these costs would be fully covered out of the 2006 World Cup budget.
8 A similar rea-
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soning held also for the above-mentioned infrastructure, provided it was built in such a 
way as to make a positive contribution to the future use of the stadium. 
If the stadium constructions and their expenditure should not be charged to the World 
Cup, then this of course is true also for the resultant long-term uses of the stadium. At 
the outset, it should be pointed out – particularly for those who apportion the stadium 
investments to the World Cup in an incorrect manner – that new stadium structures or 
stadium modernizations consistently engender novelty value: curiosity and improved 
comfort entice additional visitors to the stadium. In Germany, multivariate studies on all 
stadium projects since 1963 have demonstrated that a rise in spectator numbers of 
~2700, or ~10% per match, is attributable to the influence of the new stadium rather 
than to that of other factors that may influence spectator demand (Feddersen et al., 
2006). In selected soccer stadiums, the novelty effect can even turn out to be markedly 
greater; Hamburg and Gelsenkirchen can be cited as examples of this, with the growth 
in spectators after the opening of the new buildings (shown by the vertical lines in Fig-
ures 7a and 7b) clearly rising more strongly. To this, add the fact that the average reve-
nue per ticket rises because of the expanded area of VIP and business seating, so the 
overall ticket proceeds can rise. These increased receipts improve the ability of a club to 
acquire top players in the international market, and this leads in the medium term to an 
increased national and international competitive ability. Hence, from the point of view 
of sport, the new stadiums are an obvious asset for Germany. 
On the other hand, in Germany the opportunity was missed to aim not only for an opti-
mization of the management efficiency of the professional clubs, but also for a particu-
larly attractive, spectacular, ‘iconic’ architecture of the stadium to create an urban im-
pulse in each city, with which the process of development of each region could have 
been accelerated (Maennig 2006). The architecture of the German ‘World Cup’ stadi-
ums overall can be described as ‘functional’, while freely conceding that many technical 
innovations and creative architectural ideas are bound up in the stadiums. It must also 
be recognized that the beauty and attractiveness (also) of stadiums lies always in the 
eyes of the (loving) beholders. WP 10/2007 – One year later    13 
 
Figure 7: Novelty effect in the stadiums of Hamburg and Gelsenkirchen; Average 
number of spectators per match 

















Source: Maennig, W., A. Feddersen, M. Borcherding: Zum Neuigkeitseffekt von Stadionneubauten. 
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Nevertheless, there are no unique new constructions and iconic architectural features 
with trans-regional significance – except for the Munich arena. This, however, had to be 
situated too far from the city centre to generate a positive effect for Munich in the fore-
seeable future.
9 
There is no standard definition of ‘iconic buildings’
10, but there are plenty of examples 
among the structures that have been built: the Sydney Opera House is inseparable from 
the worldwide image of that city, and the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, which has 
given its name to the ‘Bilbao effect’ that is so lacking in the German stadiums, has con-
verted that Spanish city, which hitherto went largely unnoticed on the international sce-
ne, into one of the five most visited cities of Spain. There are even examples within 
sports architecture: the Munich Olympic Stadium with its architecture has become one 
of the best-known symbols of Munich and is still drawing visitors to the city. 
Meanwhile the effect of ‘iconic’ architecture is valued worldwide, and in many cities it 
is one of the most important parts of that city’s development strategy. In Germany on 
the other hand, the subject is still little considered, including for other areas than sports 
complexes. Admittedly, Hamburg has now chosen, with its projected Elbe Philharmonic 
Hall, what is acknowledged to be a striking architectural design, in order to redress the 
perceived shortcoming that, although the name of the city is familiar worldwide, people 
generally have no mental pictures of the city. And Frankfurt has meanwhile established 
an explicit requirement for ‘spectacular projects’ (N.N. 2007d). There are, incidentally, 
also plenty of international examples of iconic stadium projects.
11 
The club managers should not be blamed; they have the task of maximizing the income 
for their teams. For this, they must confine their endeavours to whatever is necessary to 
keep the fans happy. It is not their business to participate in municipal or regional poli-
tics, to make their architecture interesting from the point of view of the cityscape and to 
achieve ‘external’ effects for the regional economy, from which their budgets do not 
                                                 
9   For the role of the (central) location of stadiums on city development, see particularly Nelson (2001, 
2002) and Santo (2005). 
10  For a list of characteristic properties of this type of building, see Maennig (2006). 
11  For the South African preparations for the 2010 soccer World Cup, particularly in Durban, see Maen-
nig and Schwarthoff (2006). WP 10/2007 – One year later    15 
 
profit. Responsibility would have rested with the local authorities and their policy mak-
ers, who would have had to bear the additional costs of ambitious architecture (and, 
where applicable, the better location). Nota bene: the Munich Arena cost about €280 
million, whereas the average for the rest of the World Cup stadiums was about €100 
million. Considering the restricted public funds and the attitude increasingly encoun-
tered in the population that one should not give more public financial support to soccer 
‘millionaires’, this would hardly have pleased the politicians. So the German World 
Cup stadiums were about 75% privately financed, if one excludes the two historical-
political stadiums in Berlin and Leipzig – and were accordingly reduced to ‘soccer func-
tionalities’. To that extent, the voters themselves bear the responsibility for the missed 
opportunity to boost a city’s development. 
International perception of Germany and the feelgood effect for Ger-
man residents  
As a result of the World Cup, the perception of Germany has risen in other countries. 
The erstwhile image abroad of Germany as ‘hard and cold ... not a nation much associ-
ated with warmth, hospitality, beauty, culture or fun’
12 was improved through the World 
Cup in all 17 criteria that constitute the ‘Anholt Nation Brand Index’. The greatest in-
crease in approval was scored by the statement or question ‘This country excels in 
sport’. Figure 8 shows the trend in selected questions that were presented with a scale of 
6 (very good, complete agreement) to 1 (poor, no agreement). 
An additional significant effect of the World Cup must have been the experience for the 
German citizens, who might have been strongly influenced by the ‘public viewing’ in 
the fan-parks. Quantitative ex ante and ex post studies of sports events have up to now 
mostly ignored the value of an improved perception as well as the feelgood effects ex-
perienced by the people in the economy when the event takes place in their neighbour-
hood, even if they themselves do not visit the stadium. Even though this effect can have 
great significance, only a few studies
13 attempt, through a survey of payment reserves 
                                                 
12  Anholt Nation Brand Index: Q3 Report, Seattle et al., 2006. 
13  Johnson and Whitehead (2000), however, study the willingness of people to pay for two stadium pro-
jects in Lexington, Kentucky, even if they do not visit the stadiums. Atkinson et al (2006) evaluate the 
British WTP for the Olympic Games in London 2012. WP 10/2007 – One year later    16 
 
(willingness to pay), to evaluate this phenomenon of benefiting from (sports) events 
without active attendance at the stadium – a concept usually somewhat misleadingly 
termed in the sports economics literature the ‘non-use effect’. Before the World Cup, 
only one out of five Germans had a ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) for the World Cup to 
take place in Germany that differed from zero (Heyne et al., 2007). On average, the 
WTP was €4.26 per person, which with 82 million inhabitants corresponds to ~€351.5 
million. After the World Cup 42.6% had a positive WTP, and the average was €10.0, 
amounting to €830.8 million for the whole country. Since only a few of the 82 million 
Germans themselves had tickets to attend a stadium for a World Cup match, the will-
ingness to pay can be interpreted as a ‘non-use effect’. These effects are often called 
‘intangibles’, yet they are perfectly quantifiable and they were among the largest effects 
of the World Cup.
14 














































































































Source: Wave 3/2005 and 3/2006 GMI-Anholt Nations Brand Index  
                                                 
14  Heyne et al. (2007) report that the increase in the willingness to pay is attributable above all to a 
change of attitude in those who, before the World Cup, were not willing to pay anything. After the 
World Cup, an increased willingness to pay was expressed particularly among East Germans, but also 
among low-skilled persons. Heyne et al. conclude that major sporting events have a characteristic ‘ex-
perience value’; consumers cannot correctly estimate the quality of an event before their first experi-
ence of it, and hence cannot predict their willingness to pay for it. WP 10/2007 – One year later    17 
 
Summary 
The long-term economic effects of the soccer World Cup, such as from the improved 
image, can not yet be evaluated after only one year. In certain areas – the development 
strategies of the cities were singled out – there have at any rate been opportunities for 
optimization, with which the long-term benefits would have been increased. But wis-
dom comes with hindsight, and the responsibility does not lie with the organizers of the 
World Cup. 
The preceding analysis, restricted to the short-term effects, has shown that the impulses 
in retail business, tourism and employment, which are frequently in the forefront of any 
proposals for major sporting events, may indeed have been partly positive; however, 
they were not sufficient to have had any overall economic significance. For some sec-
tors such as the retail trade there may even have been negative developments – contrary 
to the official perceptions of this sector. 
For many people this is a disappointing outcome in terms of the ‘pecuniary’ effects, but 
it must be added that the economic costs of the 2006 World Cup, too, were low enough 
to be disregarded; only a negligible proportion of the costs of stadium construction and 
infrastructure should be apportioned to the soccer World Cup. 
The greatest effect of the 2006 World Cup occurred in aspects that for a long time have 
not received much attention in economic analyses, because they were mistakenly re-
garded either as not quantifiable and/or even as non-economic effects. The willingness 
to pay of the German public for the ‘non-use effects’ such as the feelgood effects and 
the improved international perception of Germany, however, amounted almost to the 
order of milliards; hence these effects are the greatest measurable effects of the 2006 
World Cup. Greater willingness to pay for a sporting event or for other events in Ger-
many has, as far as the author knows, not hitherto been recorded. In this respect, it is 
established that from an economic point of view the 2006 soccer World Cup was one of 
the greatest and economically most important events in Germany. 
To end on a positive note, mention must be made of a reported increase in the birth rate 
nine months after the soccer World Cup – anecdotal, although not yet statistically con-
firmed. The World Cup is seen as the cause, because many people in Germany were led 
by the relaxed, happy atmosphere of the World Cup to forget their cares and stresses … WP 10/2007 – One year later    18 
 
(N.N. 2007b). In view of the low birth rate in Germany, this could be not only one of 
the finest, but also one of the economically most long-term effects of the 2006 World 
Cup. 
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